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ABSTRACT 
Floating storage facility is increasingly becoming the preferred solution for new 
installation in offshore industry. The facility has the ability to handle changes of oil 
reservoir and process as well as offering storage and offloading at the same time. With 
the straight forward of building and conversion based on the ship building technology, 
the system will easily contribute to the potential hazard or risk that is difficult to 
quantify due to short of experience, if compared to shipping industry. This thesis gives 
an overview of the potential hazards during normal activity and the safety impact to 
personnel, asset and environment. The list of potential hazard is generated and 
compiled during reviewing of the literature from journals, conference proceedings, 
databases and guidelines related to offshore operation safety. The research study 
followed Risk Assessment approach by using Risk Matrix as a tool to measure the 
level of potential hazard. Survey data also analyzed through statistical method of 
analysis using SPSS. The tools from ANOVA One Way and T-Test were used to 
analyze further the significant differences of demographic facility towards potential 
hazards. Tool from Pearson Correlation is used to analyze the data for the relationship 
of the potential hazard towards safety impact of the facility. The research study 
described the potential hazards mainly from marine activities that should be 
considered at the floating storage facility operated in Malaysia. The findings reported 
that the age of facility has significant difference for ship collision, from the perspective 
of facility’s demographic. The result also shows mooring system having significant 
difference for hull failure since the statistical finding is significant. For the level of 
hazard, it shows that on the first ranking is hydrocarbon release followed by 
occupational accident, ship collision and hull failure. The result shows positive, 
significant and yet low extent for the relationship of potential hazards towards safety 
impact of the facility. The findings from the collected experience-based and research 
survey data can be applied to facilitate the development of rationalized approaches for 
the top management in decision-making for the safety guideline, policy making and 
investment towards the floating storage facility.  
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ABSTRAK 
Fasiliti penyimpanan terapung sedang berkembang pesat menjadi penyelesaian kepada 
pemasangan yang baharu dalam industri luar pesisir pantai. Fasiliti ini berkemampuan  
mengendalikan perubahan kepada takungan minyak dan proses disamping 
menawarkan penyimpanan dan pemindahan pada masa yang sama. Dengan terus 
kepada pembinaan dan penukaran berdasarkan teknologi pembinaan kapal, sistem 
tersebut dengan mudah terdedah kepada potensi bahaya atau risiko yang sukar 
diklasifikasikan kerana pengalaman yang singkat jika dibandingkan dengan industri 
perkapalan.Tesis ini akan memberikan pandangan terhadap potensi bahaya semasa 
aktiviti biasa dan impak keselamatan terhadap pekerja, aset dan persekitaran. Senarai 
potensi bahaya ini dihasil dan disusunkan semasa semakan terhadap karya dari jurnal, 
pembentangan persidangan, pangkalan data dan garispanduan yang berkenaan kepada 
operasi di luar persisir pantai. Kajian penyelidikan ini telah menggunapakai 
pendekatan dari Penilaian Risiko yang menggunakan Risiko Matriks sebagai alatan 
untuk mengukur paras potensi bahaya. Data penyelidikan ini  dianalisis melalui 
penggunaan statistic daripada analisis SPSS. Peralatan analisis tersebut adalah 
ANOVA One Way dan T-Test yang digunapakai untuk menganalisis seterusnya 
perbezaan yang signifikan dari fasiliti tersebut terhadap potensi bahaya. Korelasi 
Pearson pula  menganalisis data untuk perhubungan potensi bahaya terhadap impak 
keselamatan di fasiliti tersebut. Kajian tersebut  menerangkan potensi bahaya daripada 
aktiviti marin yang diambil kira di fasiliti penyimpanan terapung yang beroperasi di 
Malaysia. Hasil kajian melapurkan umur fasiliti mempunyai perbezaan signifikan 
terhadap pelanggaran kapal dari segi perspektif fasiliti. Keputusan juga menunjukkan 
sistem tambatan mempunyai perbezaan yang signifikan kepada kerosakan badan kapal 
di mana statistik menunjukkan ia adalah signifikan. Paras potensi bahaya yang 
menunjukkan tahap pertama adalah perlepasan hidrokarbon dan diikuti oleh 
kemalangan pekerjaan, pelanggaran kapal dan kerosakan badan kapal. Hasil dapatan 
korelasi adalah positif, signifikan, namun pada tahap rendah terhadap perhubungan 
potensi bahaya terhadap impak keselamatan fasiliti. Keputusan daripada pengumpulan 
data, pengalaman dan kajian penyelidikan akan menentu ukuran terhadap 
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perkembangan pendekatan yang rasional untuk pihak atasan mengaplikasikannya 
dalam membuat keputusan bagi garis panduan keselamatan, pembentukan polisi dan 
pelaburan terhadap fasiliti penyimpanan terapung. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
Offshore floating storage facility presents a unique combination of equipment and 
conditions not observed in any other industry. Although there are few aspects of the 
industry which are completely new, the application in an offshore environment can 
result in new potential hazards which must be identified and controlled. 
Much of the oil and gas processing equipment which utilized on offshore facilities is 
similar to the equipment used onshore for oil production activities or in chemical 
process plants. Therefore, many of the hazards associated with the process equipment 
are well known. However, the inherent space constraints on offshore structures have 
resulted in the application of some new process equipment and more importantly, 
making it difficult to mitigate hazards which separate the equipment, personnel and 
hazardous materials. Due to the facilities are located at remote locations, personnel 
who operate or service at offshore facilities typically live and work at offshore for 
extended periods of time. In many ways, these aspects of offshore operations are 
similar to those found in shipping industry. However, the operations that take place on 
offshore oil and gas production are different than those which take place on trading 
ships. 
Another difference between offshore and onshore oil and gas production is the relative 
complexity of drilling and construction activities, which contributes significantly to 
the risk. Due to the remoteness of most offshore facilities and the challenges presented 
by marine environment, drilling and construction projects are typically major 
undertakings which require the use of large and expensive marine vessel (drill ship, 
derrick barges, supply vessel, diver-support vessels, etc.). These non-routine 
operations dramatically increase the number of persons onboard a facility and the level 
marine activity, material handling and other support activities over more routine 
production activities. 
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Figure 1.0: Deepwater development system (Wikipedia) 
 
As shown by Figure 1.0, the offshore facilities can be divided into several types along 
with their respective functions: 
i. Fixed Platform (FP) consists of a jacket (a tall vertical section made of 
tubular steel members supported by piles driven into the seabed) with a 
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deck placed on top, providing space for crew quarters, a drilling rig, and 
production facilities. The fixed platform is economically feasible for 
installation in water depths up to 1,500 feet.  
ii. Compliant Tower (CT) consists of a narrow, flexible tower and a piled 
foundation that can support a conventional deck for drilling and production 
operations. Unlike the fixed platform, the compliant tower withstands large 
lateral forces by sustaining significant lateral deflections, and is usually 
used in water depths between 1,000 and 2,000 feet.  
iii. Tension Leg Platform (TLP) consists of a floating structure held in place 
by vertical, tensioned tendons connected to the sea floor by pile-secured 
templates. Tensioned tendons provide for the use of a TLP in a broad water 
depth range with limited vertical motion. The larger TLP's have been 
successfully deployed in water depths approaching 4,000 feet.  
iv. Mini-Tension Leg Platform (Mini-TLP) is a floating mini-tension leg 
platform of relatively low cost developed for production of smaller 
deepwater reserves which would be uneconomic to produce using more 
conventional deepwater production systems. It can also be used as a utility, 
satellite, or early production platform for larger deepwater discoveries. The 
world's first Mini-TLP was installed in the Gulf of Mexico in 1998. 
v. SPAR Platform (SPAR) consists of a large diameter single vertical 
cylinder supporting a deck. It has a typical fixed platform topside (surface 
deck with drilling and production equipment), three types of risers 
(production, drilling, and export), and a hull which is moored using a taut 
caternary system of six to twenty lines anchored into the seafloor. SPAR's 
are presently used in water depths up to 3,000 feet, although existing 
technology can extend its use to water depths as great as 7,500 feet. 
vi. Floating Production System (FPS) consists of a semi-submersible unit 
which is equipped with drilling and production equipment. It is anchored 
in place with wire rope and chain, or can be dynamically positioned using 
rotating thrusters. Production from subsea wells is transported to the 
surface deck through production risers designed to accommodate platform 
motion. The FPS can be used in a range of water depths from 600 to 7,500 
feet.  
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vii. Subsea System (SS) ranges from single subsea wells producing to a nearby 
platform, FPS, or TLP to multiple wells producing through a manifold and 
pipeline system to a distant production facility. These systems are presently 
used in water depths greater than 5,000 feet. 
viii. Floating Production, Storage & Offloading System (FPSO) consists of 
a large tanker type vessel moored to the seafloor.  An FPSO is designed to 
process and stow production from nearby subsea wells and to periodically 
offload the stored oil to a smaller shuttle tanker.  The shuttle tanker then 
transports the oil to an onshore facility for further processing.  An FPSO 
may be suited for marginally economic fields located in remote deepwater 
areas where a pipeline infrastructure does not exist.   
 
 
1.2 Floating Storage Facility 
Floating storage facility nowadays are becoming the preferred solution for new 
installation of oil and gas fields as oil industry seeks better economic solutions to its 
new challenges.  The facility is suited for both small marginal fields and large deep-
water reserves (Wilne, 1998). The floating storage facility is the most commonly used 
as the floating facility due to cost reasons and practical advantages if compared to 
fixed installation. With the straight forward of building and conversion, based on the 
ship building technology, the expensive offshore works can be kept to minimum as 
most of the construction, hook-up and commissioning can be completed inshore with 
significantly less cost (Alford, 1997). The floating facility has the ability to handle 
changes of oil reservoir and process as well as offering storage and offloading 
facilities. With this significant and comprehensiveness of the system, it will easily 
contribute the potential hazard or risk that is difficult to quantify due to short of 
experience if compared to shipping industry.  
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Figure1.1: FPSO Kikeh anchoring picture 
 
For the construction of floating facility, two options can be considered. First option is 
the conversion of an existing vessel. With the condition of the vessel and accepted by 
the Classification Society, the selected tanker is converted to become floating storage 
and offloading facility. Such equipment is installed to suite for the facility to receive 
oil and gas from designated oil well via subsea pipeline. Figure 1.0 shows one of the 
examples, FPSO Kikeh which was converted from existing sailing vessel to floating 
storage and offloading facility. Another option for oil storage is by building a new 
purposely built floating facility. The concept of this huge oil storage is rather similar 
with the converted vessel. Both facilities are expected to remain on the designated 
location for up to 20 years with all the environmental conditions taken into 
consideration. Some of the facilities are designed to suite the process of keeping the 
hydrocarbon which is located on top of the vessel. The floating facilities are designed 
to avoid any dry docking as compared to the practice of conventional sailing vessel. 
This poses new challenges as on-site repairing can become very difficult and 
equipment failure may have adverse consequences for vessel safety (Wilne, 1998).  
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Figure 1.2 : FPSO compartmentalizing of the ship (Gilbert and Ward, 2001). 
 
 
It is important to know the basic arrangement of the facility to understand further on 
the operations that currently occur before studying the potential hazards surrounding 
the area. The facility is divided to several compartment and equipment such as process, 
storage, mooring system, utilities and offloading equipment. Figure 1.1 shows the 
example of FPSO compartmentalizing of the ship, according to Gilbert and Ward 
(2001). The basic arrangements of facility can be divided to the following areas: 
 
 
i. Process Area 
The process plant is usually placed on the frame structure elevated at a height of about 
3.5 meters above the main deck. Equipment modules most sensitive to motions are 
likely to be placed towards midships. The modules are assembled in such a way to 
allow easy implementation and also fulfill the production requirements of the field. 
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ii. Tank arrangement 
Several tanks are dedicated to store the processing crude depending upon the ship 
design capacity. Each tank is equipped with heating coil system to heat up the crude 
to maintain the viscosity of storage crude. 
 
iii. Mooring system 
The vessel is permanently moored in position to its field. Majority of the vessel in 
Malaysian waters are using External Bow Turret System with Single Point Mooring. 
This type of mooring is connected to the seabed by mooring lines which is attached to 
anchor piles or drag anchors. This design will tolerate the vessel to rotate 3600 
depending upon the sea current condition.  And some of the vessels are also installed 
with Spread Mooring System to fix the position permanently. Each of the system is 
designed to withstand up to 100 years environmental condition.  
 
iv. Shuttle tanker mooring system 
The shuttle tanker is moored to floating vessel by tandem mooring system during 
offloading. The facility is able to moor above 150,000 DWT shuttle tanker with offtake 
parcel more than 100,000 bbls. The main components of this system are hawser and 
Quick Release Hook (QRH). QRH which commonly located at centre line of aft upper 
deck is provided with hydraulic operating system to ensure hawser is released under 
maximum load condition under monitoring system. The QRH is remotely controlled 
from CCR as well as local control. 
 
v. Custody metering system 
A custody metering skid installed on an elevated platform on upper deck for metering 
during offloading activity. The height of the metering skid is to comply with the 
statutory requirement. The custody metering skid is designed for a nominal offload 
capacity up to 20,000 bbls/hr. 
 
vi. Inert gas (IG) and tank venting system 
The existing system is normally retained and is modified in accordance to SOLAS 
74/2000 requirement and national regulations.  The flue gas from exhaust boiler is 
directed through IG cooling system before entering cargo tanks. 
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vii. Cargo system 
The cargo system comprises of crude oil and fuel gas from turret swivel system to 
production process and subsequently distributed to storage tanks. The offloading is 
carried out at the stern of the facility via floating flexible hose, which is monitored by 
a metering skid. This line is equipped with a double closure marine break away 
coupling to minimize accidental oil spills. Additionally, it protects oil transfer system 
from tensile overloading when export tanker drifting away.  This also prevents any 
surge pressure in case of incorrect valve control at export tanker.  
 
viii. Power generation and distribution 
Main power supply on the facility is generated by either gas turbine or steam turbine 
generators, depending upon the design capacity. The generators are suitable for 
parallel operation which allows load sharing of different diver and rating. Emergency 
diesel generator is installed to be initiated automatically, soon after a blackout. 
 
ix. Escape and evacuation system 
The muster areas are designated at strategic places with adequate exit signage for the 
personnel evacuation during emergency. The escape routes are provided with proper 
illumination and signage on every level leading to the muster areas.  
 
x. Active fire protection system 
The purpose of active fire protection systems onboard floating facilities are to: 
 Control fires and limit escalation. 
 Reduce the effects of a fire to allow personnel to undertake emergency response 
activities or to escape and evacuate if necessary. 
 Extinguish the fire where it is considered safe to do so. 
 Limit the damage to structure and equipment. 
The normal active fire protection systems provided onboard floating facilities are as 
follows: 
 Fire deluge and water curtain system 
 Engine room fire extinguisher system 
 Main deck foam system 
 Helideck fire protection system 
9 
 
 Galley fire extinguisher system 
 
xi. Passive fire protection system 
For normal operation and design, the floating facilities are equipped with passive fire 
protection to control and mitigate the hazard. The passive fire protection systems 
provided onboard floating facilities are as follow: 
 A60 fire insulation wall at control room, fire control station and accommodation. 
 A0 fire insulation wall at deck plate and deck head. 
 
xii. Fire and Gas detection 
The Fire and Gas (F&G) system is designed and installed to provide detection of fire 
or a leak of flammable vapour onboard the floating storage facility, in a rapid and 
reliable way. 
The F&G system function as below: 
 Provide early and reliable detection of the presence of fire or flammable vapours. 
 Alert the personnel. 
 Initiate protective action. 
The Fire and Gas system will receive input signals from end devices such as flame 
detectors, heat detectors, smoke detectors, gas detectors and manual fire alarm call 
points. These will protect personnel and equipment by providing automatic equipment 
shutdown and activation of fire suppression equipment. 
 
xiii. Lifesaving appliances 
Lifesaving equipment for personnel evacuation and rescue are distributed strategically 
around the floating facility. Lifesaving appliances are designed in compliance with 
SOLAS requirements and Flag Administration.  
The totally enclosed self-propelled survival crafts lifeboats, with 100% capacity for 
persons onboard are installed in suitable type davits at ideal location on port and 
starboard side of boat deck.  
In addition, the other lifesaving system, the life rafts are installed and located at port 
side, starboard side and main deck with 100% capacity for persons onboard if lifeboats 
are failing to engage. The life buoys with flame proof illumination are located at the 
various and strategic place for man overboard. 
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xiv. Manpower philosophy and responsibility 
Each facility has different numbers of manpower depending upon the respective duties 
and responsibilities. This mainly consists of the regular crew for operation and 
maintenance, as well as contractor for various activities onboard.  
 
As described by Offshore Journal (2000), there are several advantages and 
disadvantages for the floating storage to be operated at offshore location. 
Advantages: 
 Cheaper than deepwater pipelines. 
 Development will take place earlier. 
 Render some fields commercial that are not developable due to infrastructure 
access or other transport limitations. 
 Balance competition for smaller producers with larger producers. 
 Able to store tons of fluid. 
 Generally insensitive to depth, so can work in deepwater. 
 Contractors can lease the vessel. 
 Is gradually becoming a commodity as mobile service offshore. 
 Pipeline contractors still competitive because increased number of fields 
made commercial in deepwater and ultra-deepwater by the FPSO option. 
 Vessel can connect to pipeline almost anywhere. 
Disadvantages: 
 Takes 1-2 years to convert or build. 
 Companies compete with own pipeline infra-structure. 
 Companies must conduct timely and costly environmental study for a 
specific field once accepted. 
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Table 1.0: Number and cost of worldwide floaters orders, 2000-2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RigLogix, 2011. 
 
Table 1.0 above shows the number and cost of worldwide floaters order in 2000 to 
2011. There were three orders in 2001 and two orders in 2002. As orders increased in 
the middle part of the decade, price rose. Following the 2008 recession, order declined 
markedly but prices only declined marginally (Mark and Brian, 2012). In 2011, the 
demand of the floaters starts to increase back together with the price with an average 
600 to 700 million dollars for 27 units ordered.  
 
In business operation perspective, when external cost tends to increase top 
management strives to decrease internal operational expenses, in whichever potential 
areas within their circle of influence. Hence, potential hazard could impact hugely into 
unexpected expense, if disaster happens. Furthermore, this subject matter is within 
their control. As such, it must be mitigated and controlled by identifying existing 
potential hazards. This prevention measure can be initiated through an identification 
process of audit and assessment, on board of the facility by a committee of relevant 
staff members.  
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1.3 Potential hazard onboard facility 
Hazard identification is a formal activity to examine all aspects of the operation under 
consideration using a pro-forma approach. It depends on the quality of the input data 
available and is typically performed as a table-top exercise lead by an experienced 
facilitator and the participation by representatives covering the full range of design 
and operational expertise for the system under consideration (Spires, 2001). As 
pointed out by Spires (2001), the hazard identification has considered a total of 11 
different hazard categories that exists during the production phase of development. 
The hazards considered were categorized as listed below: 
i. Blowout 
ii. Riser and pipeline leaks 
iii. Process leak 
iv. Non-process fire and explosions 
v. Cargo storage events 
vi. Marine accidents on the FPSO 
vii. Offloading accidents 
viii. Tanker transportation 
ix. Non-process spill 
x. Ship collision 
xi. Transportation (supply vessel and helicopters) 
 
Biasotto and Rouhan (2004) explain that each identified hazard is analyzed in terms 
of its functional failure, failure mode, consequences (including the possible different 
scenarios), existing barriers, control methods and repair strategies. The identified 
hazards are qualitatively classified on the basis of the like-hood and the related 
consequences regarding risks to personnel, to environment and to asset and production 
(Biasotto and Rouhan, 2004). 
 
The major hazard to the offshore oil and gas facility is not much different from others 
as described in lesson learn of the offshore accidents. They are clearly categorized as:  
loss of well control or blowout, fire from the process plant, explosion from the process 
plant, H2S and naturally occurring radioactive materials from reservoir, extreme 
weather, ship collision, seismic events and helicopter or other aircraft impact 
(Galbraith and Terry, 2008). For the past few years, the major accidents happen 
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involving multiples fatalities, equipment damage and environment impact that require 
high cost to overcome the situation.  Khan et al. (2004) also point out that the main 
hazards on offshore installation are the processed fluids and processing operations, the 
sea environment and the process links between the reservoir and other installations. 
The lesson-learnt is part of the process to identify the hazards and mitigate them to as 
minimum as possible. These unfortunate events have happened to ‘Alexander L 
Kjelland – structure failure during adverse weather condition’, ‘Ocean Ranger – 
capsized due to ballasting’, ‘Piper Alpha – hydrocarbon release’ and ‘Helicopter Super 
Puma crash at Cormorant’, as described in “The Offshore Industry – Learning from 
Accidents” by Galbraith and Terry (2008). 
 
Khan et al. (2004) also mentioned that the main hazards on offshore installations are 
the process fluids and processing operations, the sea environment and the process links 
between the reservoir and other installations. Vinnem (2000) described, there are some 
differences with respect to how the risk contributions are categorized, but there are 
nevertheless some clear observations that could be made: 
 
 Hydrocarbon associated risk (process, turret and riser) is the highest 
contribution for all FPSOs considered. 
 Collision risk represents a significant contribution for two of the FPSOs (all 
potential collision scenarios are included but shuttle tanker impact is the 
dominating contribution). 
 Occupational accidents and accidents during helicopter transport were only 
included for one of the cases. 
 
The statistics from offshore overseas facility and offshore Malaysian facility are also 
taken to show the total number of incident and accident for the past few years of 
operation. This is for reference and guidance as such actual incident will give direct 
impact to personnel, assets and environment.  The experienced-based data from 
offshore UKCS and Petronas Carigali Health Safety and Environment have been 
collected and compiled for reference. 
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The statistic of occurrences for floating production storage and offloading facility for 
year 1990 – 2007 is shown in table 1.1 based on the HSE UK (Oil and Gas UK 2009). 
It shows the total number of 685 occurrences happening during 17 years of floating 
storage facilities which are operated in UK.  
 
Table 1.1: The statistic of occurrences for floating, production, storage and 
offloading facility for year 1990 – 2007(Oil and Gas UK 2009). 
 
 
The highest occurrence shows the total numbers of 404 from oil spill and hydrocarbon 
release. This occurrence represents the severe impact to the environment. The second 
highest is falling object with 96 occurrences, followed by crane accident and fire at 
the facility. The falling object, crane accident and fire can be representing the impact 
to personnel and facility asset. The number of ‘0’ shows that there is no occurrence 
happens to the facility but it might be happening if the awareness of the hazard is not 
seriously taken into consideration.  
 
Table 1.2 shows the statistic of Incident Investigation Report (IIR) from 1/1/2003 to 
31/3/2011 that has been reported by PMO Petronas Carigali Health Safety and 
Environment (HSE) Department.  The reports were taken from 7 locations in 
Peninsular Malaysia; i.e, Abu cluster, Anding, Penara Lukut, FPSO Perintis, Puteri, 
Sotong and Malong. Based on the statistics, 66 IIRs were reported from these 
locations, as shown in the table. 
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Table 1.2: The statistic of Incident Investigation Report (IIR) from year 2003 to year 
2011 by PMO Petronas Carigali (HSE Online 2011). 
 
 
As for the safety impact of operation in Malaysia, only one fatality, 10 equipment 
damages and 1 oil spill recorded with highest 18 near misses had happened for over 8 
years of statistics (HSE Petronas Carigali, 2011).  
 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
The floating storage facility was primary installed for storing and offloading 
petroleum crude oil related activity. Nowadays, with the modern technology, the 
facility becomes offshore producing installation; hence, storage facility and offloading 
terminal are all merged into one integrated infrastructure. The facility allows oil 
companies to produce oil in more remotes areas and in deeper water. As such, floating 
storage facility would have been making it economically possible, in comparison to 
other technology. The facility allows storage of crude oil and offloading of tankers in 
the field rather than requiring a pipeline to transport oil to offshore terminal facility. 
However, the provision of storage and offloading has introduced respective potential 
hazards. Hence, this challenge requires wisdom and experience to manage the 
associated risks.  
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The floating storage facility in Malaysia nowadays also has typical similar problems 
on the potential hazards being handled, in comparison to other storage facility around 
the globe. Some of the hazards are being studied and have been taken into 
consideration during facility’s design stage. But the projection of the level of hazards 
is not known until the facility is fully in operation at the oil field. The level of hazards 
during design stage is applied as a guideline, in order to establish some safety 
procedure in preventing incident and accident case at the facility. With these guideline 
and procedure, the management of each facility will impose several safety campaigns 
for enhancing the awareness level. This may prevent death to personnel, damage to 
property and oil pollution to the environment. Despite the continuous effort being 
taken by the management, the problem still arises where we can see that the incident 
and accident still happen nowadays. The actual level of hazards needs to be studied 
further. The relationship towards the safety impact also needs to be highlighted so that 
the implication to personnel, asset and environment can be determined further.  
 
 
A more detailed analyses of past accidents and events have been performed based on 
the database (World Offshore Accident Dataset) of DNV. This is one of the most 
reliable and most complete databases of failure, incidents and accidents in the offshore 
oil and gas sector (Christou and Konstantinidou, 2012).  
 
Table 1.3 provides the number of accidental events for the different types of unit by 
Christou and Konstantinidou (2012). The information given included all types of 
offshore facilities from the European area. Within the WOAD database, the records 
are classified in 4 categories: 
- Insignificant events 
- Near-misses 
- Incidents/Hazardous situations 
- Accidents 
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Table 1.3: Number of accidental events for different Types of Unit 
 
Type of Unit Accidents Incidents/Hazardous 
situation 
Near miss Insignificant 
Barge (not 
drilling) 
41 20 2 0 
Concrete 
structure 
81 419 74 136 
Drill barge 65 22 0 2 
Drill ship 91 65 3 4 
Drilling tender 10 4 0 1 
Flare 1 0 0 1 
FPSO/FSU 10 68 8 23 
Helicopter-
Offshore duty 
238 17 13 3 
Jacket 716 889 127 252 
Jackup 552 210 13 33 
Loading buoy 13 19 2 5 
Mobile unit (not 
drill) 
18 3 0 0 
Unkn.fixed 
struct/others 
3 3 0 1 
Pipeline 139 111 1 4 
Semi-
submersible 
227 626 147 119 
Ship, not drilling 
or production 
6 27 1 8 
Submersible 19 5 0 1 
Subsea 
install/complete 
4 6 0 2 
Tension leg 
platform 
13 132 22 29 
Well support 
structure 
122 36 2 2 
 
Insignificant events represent hazardous situation, with very minor consequences. In 
most of the cases, no damage was registered and repairs were not required. Small spills 
of crude oil and chemicals are also included in this category. The database also 
includes very minor personnel injuries, such as “lost time incidents”. 
Near-misses represent events that might have or could have developed into an 
accidental situation. No damage and no repair was required also in these cases. 
Incidents represent hazardous situation which have not developed into an accidental 
situation. Low degree of damage was recorded but repair/replacements usually were 
required. This type includes also events causing minor injuries to personnel or health 
injuries. 
Accidents represent hazardous situation which have developed into an accidental 
situation. In addition, for all situation/events causing fatalities and severe injuries this 
type of event has been used. 
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1.5 Research questions 
Research questions are the process of gathering data, synthesizing information to 
develop an understanding of overall study, and seeking answers which consist of the 
following elements: 
a. What is the level of hydrocarbon release, ship collision, hull failure and 
occupational accidents at the floating storage facility? 
b. What are the significant differences between the elements of demographic 
facility towards the element of potential hazards? 
c. Is there any relationship between potential hazards and the safety impact of the 
facility? 
 
1.6 Research aim 
This study describes the potential hazards, mainly from marine activities, that should 
be considered at the floating storage facility operating in Malaysia. This contributes to 
better understanding on the level of potential hazard onboard the floating storage 
facility and also the impact from the potential hazard to the personnel, asset and 
environment. The findings from the collected experience-based and research survey 
data will eventually facilitate the development of rationalized approaches for the top 
management in decision-making for the safety guideline, policy making and 
investment towards the floating storage facility.  
 
 
1.7 Research objective 
In associating with hazard or risk that contributed to the facility, the main aim of this 
research is to focus on the following objectives: 
a. To measure the level of potential hazard that consists of several key safety 
elements such as, hydrocarbon release, ship collision, hull failure and 
occupational accidents at floating storage facility. 
b. To analyze the significant differences between the element of demographic 
floating facility towards element of potential hazard. 
c. To investigate the relationship between potential hazard towards the safety 
impact of the facility. 
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1.8 Scope of the research 
The conceptual diagram is serving as a guide for further evaluation of the relationship 
between potential hazards and safety impact. This study focuses on the floating storage 
that currently operates at Malaysian waters. This research also measures the level of 
significant differences between the elements of demographic floating facility. Each of 
the floating storage facilities are operated by different field owners, hence this could 
depict their delivery capability, reliability and integrity towards the safety aspect on 
the facilities. Table 1.0 shows the selected facilities that currently operate in Malaysia 
for this study. 
 
 
Table1.4: List of facilities in this study 
 
Name of facilities Field Owner 
1. FSO Angsi Talisman Energy 
2. FSO Cendor Petrofac Malaysia Ltd 
3. FSO Abu Petronas Carigali 
4. FPSO Kikeh Murphy Oil Ltd 
 
 
 
1.9 Summary 
 
In general, the floating storage facility is the combination of offshore traditional 
process technology and marine technology. Thus, it is quite dependable on overall 
operational safety control. It is essential that scenarios involving potential hazards are 
assessed at an early stage in the design of new facilities, in order to optimize technical 
and operational solutions. This study is conducted to establish the research survey data 
of potential hazards for floating storage facility. In addition, research assessment is 
engaged on hazards’ level, significant differences from demographic facility towards 
potential hazards and the relationship between potential hazards towards safety 
impact. This is based on the actual data of each facility operated at the field for the 
past few years. In chapter 2, the literature review elaborates on the potential hazards 
being involved at the floating storage facility. The hazards include the hydrocarbon 
release, ship collision, hull failure and occupational accidents.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The floating storage structure has been used widely and reliably throughout the oil 
industry for many years. The floating storage facility was primarily installed as for 
storage and offloading activity. Nowadays, with the modern technology, the facility 
becomes offshore producing installation, storage facility and offloading terminal all 
rolled into one single unit. Moan et al. (2002) describe that the floating storage and 
production unit is a vessel that receives oil and gas from subsea wells through flow 
lines known as risers. The vessels can be a purpose-built ship or semi-submersible, or 
a converted shipping line tanker. This facility is commonly known as floating, 
production, storage and offloading (FPSO). The vessel without production system is 
termed as floating, storage and offloading (FSO). 
 
Moan et al. (2002) explain that the vessel should perform five functions: 
 Process oil and gas through the production processing facilities; 
 Receive oil and gas through the riser system; 
 Discharge oil, gas and water through the riser and/or offloading system; 
 Store oil onboard the vessel, using tanks, piping and inert gas system; 
 Remain on position by means of a mooring system or station-keeping system. 
 
Vinnem (2000) explains from the operational safety perspective of FPSOs: initial 
summary report; although the facilities are becoming more common, operational 
safety performance may still be considered somewhat unproven, especially when 
compared to fixed installations. Furthermore, floating installations are more dependent 
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on continued operation of some of the marine control systems, during a critical 
situation. There is accordingly a need to understand the aspects of operational safety 
for the facilities, in order to enable a proactive approach to safety, particularly in the 
following areas: 
 
 Turret operations and flexible risers 
 Simultaneous marine and production activities 
 Vessel movement/weather exposure 
 Production, ballasting and offloading 
 
 
The floating storage and offloading facility has the ability to handle changes of oil 
reservoir and process, as well as offering storage and offloading of the treated crude 
to other export tankers. With this significant and comprehensiveness of the system, it 
will easily contribute to the potential hazard or risk which is difficult to quantify due 
to FPSO’s limited experience if compared to long time spanning of shipping industry.  
The hazard is defined as a situation with a potential source of harm that are causing 
human injury, damage to the environment, damage to property or any combination of 
such event (BS EN ISO 17776:2002). It may be a physical situation (e.g. a shuttle 
tanker is a hazard because it may collide with the production installation), an activity 
(e.g. crane operations are a hazard because the load might drop) or a material (e.g. fuel 
oil is a hazard because it might catch fire). The essence of a hazard is that it has a 
potential for causing harm, regardless of how likely or unlikely such occurrence might 
be. 
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2.2 Potential hazard at the floating storage facility 
 
2.2.1  Hydrocarbon release 
 
Figure 2.0: The hazard from hydrocarbon release 
 
Hydrocarbon release is one of the potential hazards that can cause fire and explosion 
to the facility. These events have the potential to cause catastrophic loss of facility and 
multiple fatalities. Figure 2.0 shows the hazard from hydrocarbon release such as 
pipeline failure or burst, flexible riser failure, tank venting and loss of well control or 
blowout. The activities involve receiving produced oil from the process facilities, 
distributing it to the storage tanks under controlled conditions and discharging the final 
product to the off-take tanker. The process facilities may be above the deck of the 
storage vessel as they would be on an FPSO, or they may be a remote platform as they 
would be for an FSO. In this case, it is assumed that the process facility delivers 
‘treated crude oil’ to the storage facility as most of the base sediment and water have 
been removed consistently with normal specifications for crude oil transportation. 
Although crude handling of the facility is similar in many aspects to crude oil handling 
tanker, the facility is continuously loading the product whilst carrying out the other 
operations as well. Concurrent operations and the sequence of these operations can 
Pipeline 
failure/burst 
Flexible 
riser failure 
Tank venting 
Loss of well 
control (blowout) 
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differ greatly from conventional tankers and result in the greatest risks to be managed 
through procedures and system design.  
 
As described by Vinnem (2000) that there are some differences with respect to how 
the contributions of hazards are categorized. But, there are nevertheless some clear 
observations that the hydrocarbon associated risk from process, turret and riser are the 
highest contribution for all floating storage facility considered. Khan et al. (2004) also 
mentioned that the source of major hazard in offshore processing are the inventories 
of flammable materials in the risers, associated pipelines of the reservoir, slug 
catchers, separators, heat exchanger and high speed rotating equipment such as 
turbines, compressors, export pumps and reinjection pumps. Therefore, these items 
should be the main targets for inherently safer approaches. Hydrocarbon release, in 
this context, is defined as gas or oil leaks (including condensation) from process flow, 
well flow or flexible risers with a release rate greater than 0.1 kg/s (Aven et al.,  2006) 
 
The most significant disaster due to hydrocarbon release is offshore production 
platform, called Piper Alpha on July 1988. It is believed that the leak came from pipe 
work connected to a condensation pump. A safety valve had been removed from this 
pipe work for overhaul and maintenance. The pump itself was undergoing 
maintenance work. When the pipe work from which the safety valve had been 
removed was pressurized at start – up following a shift change, the first leak occurred. 
The leaks continued until the massive leakage of condensate gas ignited, causing an 
explosion which led to large oil fires. The heat ruptured the riser of a gas pipeline 
produced further massive explosion and fireball that engulfed Piper Alpha. Ultimately, 
167 people died, including the 2 man crew of a fast rescue boat dispatched from a 
standby vessel. All these chains of events took just 22 minutes with 62 people survived 
(Galbraith and Terry, 2008). 
 
 
2.2.1.1  Pipeline failure/burst 
The pipeline failure or burst can cause massive hydrocarbon release to atmosphere. If 
this situation cannot be controlled, there will be a fire and explosion to the facility 
which causes major disaster. For offshore pipelines, the cleanup can be extremely 
difficult and the consequences to the environment might be severe. The main cause of 
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pipeline ruptures and leaks are corrosion (both internal and external), construction 
damage, welding failure, incorrect operation and third party damage, such as ship 
anchors and bottom trawls (Rygg, 2002).  
 
The Piper Alpha catastrophe in 1988 revealed the potential of operational failures with 
respect to dramatically destroying an entire offshore installation. When a severe 
hydrocarbon leak occurred due to operational oversights, other safety barriers 
collapsed mainly due to lack of prudent safety culture (Vinnem, 2006). In most FPSO 
Safety Cases, the areas identified to be potentially highest risk are the engine room, 
process plant and the turret. For the turret and process area, the Safety Case is generally 
based on the likelihood and consequences of a process facilities explosion. It is 
assumed that a release of gas or process fluids in the process areas would, if ignited, 
lead to a jet fire. Other explosion scenarios are also considered (Wall et al., 2001) 
Wall et al. (2001) also describe that the consequences of turret explosion could 
typically be: 
 Structural damage or plastic deformation of the turret. Missile generation is 
not considered credible. No potential for escalation to the gas injection 
manifold. 
 Fatality to all individuals involved in the initial blast. 
 Serious injury confined to turret and immediate surrounding area. High 
number of serious casualties. 
 Local escape and evacuation routes are potentially destroyed or damaged. 
 Process area inventories are potentially vulnerable to escalation but not 
envisaged. 
For the disconnect-able turret designs the connection and disconnection is an 
important part of the turret safety case. 
 
 
2.2.1.2  Flexible riser failure  
There are two types of configuration system when referring to FSO or FPSO. Spread-
Moored System and Turret Moored System are quite common, in use for the floating 
storage facility around the globe. Turret Moored System may be fixed internally to the 
hull or mounted on an extension of the hull. The mooring lines are spread radially 
from the turret and anchored to the sea bed via drag embedment anchors. The turret 
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